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Abstract
The present paper explores the connection between in￿ ation and unem-
ployment in di⁄erent models with fair wages both in the short and in the long
runs. Under customary assumptions regarding the sign of the parameters of
the e⁄ort function, more in￿ ation lowers the unemployment rate, though to
a declining extent. This is because ￿rms respond to in￿ ation - that spurs
e⁄ort by decreasing the reference wage - by increasing employment, so to
maintain the e⁄ort level constant, as implied by the Solow condition. Under
wage staggering this e⁄ect is stronger because wage dispersion magni￿es the
impact of in￿ ation on e⁄ort. A stronger e⁄ect of in￿ ation on unemployment
is also produced under varying as opposed to ￿xed capital, given that in the
former case the boom produced by a monetary expansion is reinforced by
an increase in investment. Our baseline results are robust to the adoption
of a model based on reciprocity in labour relations. Therefore, we provide a
new theoretical foundation for recent empirical contributions ￿nding negative
long- and short-run e⁄ects of in￿ ation on unemployment.
Keywords: e¢ ciency wages, money growth, long-run Phillips curve,
trend in￿ ation, wage staggering, reciprocity in labour relations.
JEL classi￿cation codes: E3, E20, E40, E50.
21 Introduction
The economic literature has recently witnessed a ￿ ourishing of contributions
nesting an e¢ ciency wages framework into business cycle models. Earlier
models were proposed within the real business cycle (RBC) realm. Danthine
and Donaldson (1990), for instance, showed that e¢ ciency wages within a
RBC model can produce structural unemployment, but not wage stickiness
over the economic cycle. With di⁄erence to Danthine and Donaldson (1990),
which focused on a gift exchange model, Uhlig and Xu (1995) and Gomme
(1999) adopted a shirking model. However, in a rather similar way, they
found that wages tend to be too volatile and employment not enough so over
the cycle. In Kiley (1997) e¢ ciency wages generate completely a-cyclical real
wages, but not a greater endogenous price stickiness, because the a-cyclical
real-wage requires countercyclical e⁄ort and hence a procyclical marginal
cost.
Collard and de la Croix (2000) showed that, once including past compen-
sations into the reference wage, an e¢ ciency wages/RBC model can replicate
wage acyclicality. Along similar lines, Danthine and Kurmann (2004) pro-
posed a model combining e¢ ciency wages of the gift exchange variety - also
termed fair wages - with sticky prices, showing that it can well account for
the low correlation between wages and employment, also displaying a greater
internal propagation of monetary shocks than standard New Keynesian mod-
els. Danthine and Kurmann (2008), inspired by Rabin (1993), explicitly mod-
elled the psychological bene￿ts arising from gift exchanges between ￿rms and
workers in terms of remuneration and e⁄ort respectively. Danthine and Kur-
mann (2010) incorporated a reciprocity-based model of wage determination
into a dynamic general equilibrium model, which was then estimated on U.S.
data. They highlighted that wage setting is driven more by rent-sharing and
past wages, than by aggregate employment conditions.
Alexopoulos (2004, 2006, 2007) developed a model in which shirkers are
not dismissed once detected. They, instead, forgo an increase in compensa-
3tion. Under these assumptions it was showed that an e¢ ciency wage model
can well replicate empirical evidence regarding the response of the economic
system to technological, ￿scal and monetary shocks.
The present paper, instead, focuses on the long-run and short-run im-
plications of e¢ ciency wages for the connection between unemployment and
in￿ ation under trend money growth within a dynamic general equilibrium
framework. In so doing, we extend a literature that so far investigated the
long-run and, to a lesser extent, the short-run e⁄ects of money growth by re-
sorting only to models with wage/price stickiness. Pioneering contributions
on this issue were King and Wolman (1996) and Ascari (1998). The former
study considered a model with a shopping time technology and it obtained
a number of di⁄erent results, among which there is that long-run in￿ ation
reduces ￿rms￿markup, boosting the level of output. Ascari (1998), instead,
showed that in wage-staggering models money can have considerable nega-
tive non-superneutralities once not considering restrictively simple utility and
production functions. Deveraux and Yetman (2002) focused on a menu cost
model. An analysis of dynamic general equilibrium models under di⁄erent
contract schemes in presence of trend in￿ ation was o⁄ered in Ascari (2004).
Graham and Snower (2004), instead, examined the microeconomic mecha-
nisms underlying this class of models. In presence of Taylor wage stagger-
ing, in a monopolistically competitive labour market, they highlighted three
channels through which in￿ ation a⁄ects output: employment cycling, labour
supply smoothing and time discounting. The ￿rst one consists in ￿rms con-
tinuously shifting labour demand from one cohort to the other according to
their real wage. Given that di⁄erent labour kinds are imperfect substitutes,
this generates ine¢ ciencies and it tends to create a negative in￿ ation-output
nexus. The second one is that households demand a higher wage in pres-
ence of employment cycling given that they would prefer a smoother working
time. This decreases labor supply and aggregate output. Finally under time
discounting the contract wage depends more on the current (lower) level of
4prices than on the future (higher) level of prices and, therefore - over the
contract period - the real wage will be lower the greater is the in￿ ation rate,
spurring labour demand and aggregate output. The time discounting e⁄ect
dominates at lower in￿ ation rates, while the other two e⁄ects at higher in￿ a-
tion rates, producing a hump-shaped long-run Phillips curve. The ultimate
goal of Graham and Snower (2004) is questioning the customary assumption
to identify aggregate demand and supply shocks, namely that the former
ones would be temporary and the latter ones not so. As a consequence also
the concept of the NAIRU would be unsuitable for a fruitful investigation of
the dynamics of the unemployment rate.
Graham and Snower (2004) was extended in a number of di⁄erent di-
rections. Graham and Snower (2008) showed that under hyperbolic time
discounting positive money non-superneutralities are more sizeable than un-
der exponential discounting. Vaona and Snower (2007, 2008) showed how the
shape of the long-run Phillips curve depends on the shape of the production
function. Finally, Vaona (2010) extended the model by Graham and Snower
(2004) from the in￿ ation-output domain to the in￿ ation-real growth one.
We here propose six variations on the theme of e¢ ciency wages and the
Phillips curve. In the ￿rst one, e¢ ciency wages of the gift exchange variety
are coupled with trend money growth, once specifying the reference wage
as a function of the unemployment rate, the current individual real wage,
the current aggregate real wage and of the current real value of the past
aggregate wage. After Becker (1996), this speci￿cation has been termed in
the literature as social norm case. Being here the reference wage a function of
the current real value of the past aggregate wage and not, as in Danthine and
Kurmann (2004), of the past real wage, we can highlight the macroeconomic
consequences of a peculiar gift exchange between ￿rms and workers that was
not investigated so far, though being empirically relevant. Bewley (1999)
stresses many times that ￿rms, though not liking wage indexation, are not
insensitive to the damages produced by in￿ ation to the purchasing power of
5wages. If workers perform well, pay managers will consider fair to o⁄set the
negative e⁄ect in￿ ation can have on workers￿standard of living1. This can be
conceptualized as a gift exchange: workers elicit e⁄ort and ￿rms maintain the
purchasing power of their wages. We show that this mechanism can produce
sizeable money non-superneutralities both in the short and long run.
In our second variation, the reference wage is not a function of the current
real value of the past aggregate wage, rather of that of the past individual
one, as in the personal norm case. Our third model combines Taylor wage
stickiness with fair wages of the social norm variety. In this setting, posi-
tive money non-superneutralities turn out to be stronger than under ￿ exible
wages2. The fourth variation extends the ￿rst one by considering varying
instead of ￿xed capital. In the ￿fth and sixth variations, we show that our
baseline results also hold in a framework ￿ la Danthine and Kurmann (2008,
2010).
With di⁄erence to Graham and Snower (2004, 2008) we provide not only
a long-run analysis but also a short-run one, because we think that, even if
1To the reader convenience we report some quotations from Bewley (1999). "Other
important in￿ uences were raises at other ￿rms competing in the same labor markets and
changes in the cost of living. Employers wished to protect employees￿standard of living,
both to maintain morale and out of a sense of moral responsibility. Many ￿rms did not,
however, fully o⁄set increases in living costs in all circumstances" (pp. 160-161). "When
hiring someone, I pay them a salary equal to the value of their job. In￿ ation e⁄ectively
reduces it, and fairness requires that I o⁄set the reduction. I think that is the way it
ought to be. If I hire people at a certain rate, I want to keep that level constant in
terms of standard of living" (p. 164). "In deciding on the level of raises, we look at the
rate of in￿ ation in the cost of living. It is an indicator of what the competition is doing
(...)" (p. 165). "Cost-of-living in￿ ation was a major factor in the determination of raises.
[...] The pay of low-performing workers was often allowed to fall behind in￿ ation" (p.
208). "Question: Would a pay cut of 10 percent with no in￿ ation have more impact on
employees than a pay freeze with 10 percent in￿ ation? Answer: Both are wage cuts. [...]
The company would have to be in trouble. In both cases, people might leave [...]" (p.
209).
Also Levine (1993) ￿nds that companies tend to o⁄er larger wage increases in presence
of higher in￿ ation, though not in a one-to-one proportion.
2Fan (2007) proposed to merge sticky and e¢ ciency wages, but not in an intertemporal
optimization framework as we do here.
6one cannot identify demand and supply shocks on the basis of their tran-
sience, it will be interesting to investigate how the economic system reacts to
temporary monetary shocks. In other words, transition dynamics does not
lose interest.
Our results can o⁄er a new theoretical foundation for the empirical ￿nd-
ings obtained in various recent contributions, that have already been dis-
cussed in Karanassou et al. (2010). A brief review is o⁄ered here focusing on
the analyzed countries and time periods, on the adopted econometric meth-
ods and on a common result of theirs, which is particularly relevant to our
analysis.
Karanassou et al. (2003, 2005) bring dynamic multi-equation models to
both European and US annual data from 1977 to 1998 and from 1966 to 2000
respectively. In the former case they rely on panel data methods, while in
the latter one on the three-stage least squares (3SLS) estimator. Karanassou
et al. (2008a) expands the model by Karanassou et al. (2005) by endo-
genizing productivity and ￿nancial wealth and deriving the unemployment
rate from labour supply and demand equations. Then they apply a six-
equation structural model to US data running from 1965 to 2000 by using
an autoregressive distributed lags (ARDL) estimator. Model simulation are
￿nally o⁄ered over the period from 1993 to 2000 reaching the conclusion that
money growth put upward pressure on in￿ ation and substantially lowered
unemployment. Rising productivity growth, budget de￿cit reductions, and
a widening trade de￿cit played a minor role in in￿ ation and unemployment
dynamics. Karanassou et al. (2008b) bring a structural model to Spanish
annual data from 1966 to 1998 by using both ARDL and 3SLS estimators.
A common result of theirs is that in￿ ation and unemployment are connected
not only in the short-run but in the long-run too. The long-run elasticity
of in￿ ation with respect to unemployment was estimated to be about ￿3:5;
which was explained by resorting to frictional growth, namely the interplay
between frictions (lagged adjustments) and growth in economic variables. In
7the light of our models, this result can be also interpreted as the outcome of
e¢ ciency wages mechanisms as explained below.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The next section introduces
the households￿problem and the government budget constraint, which are
common to most of the models here presented. Afterwards, we will introduce
the ￿rms￿problem for the social norm case with ￿ exible wages, the personal
norm case under ￿ exible wages, the social norm case with wage staggering and
the social norm case with varying capital. The seventh section shows that our
results hold also adopting a model based on reciprocity on labour relations
￿ la Danthine and Kurmann (2008, 2010). The last section concludes.
In all the cases, we show what is the impact of money growth on both the
unemployment and the in￿ ation rates both in the short- and in the long-runs
and we discuss the plausibility of our models in order to detect our preferred
ones. Introducing capital accumulation at a later stage is not an unusual
procedure in the New-Keynesian literature (see for instance Huang and Liu,
2002; Ascari, 2004; Danthine and Kurmann, 2010). Some contributions do
not even consider capital accumulation (Ascari 1998; Graham and Snower,
2004, 2008; Danthine and Kurmann, 2008; Ascari and Ropele, 2009). This
can be explained by at least two reasons. In the ￿rst place, as reminded
by Ascari (2004), McCallum and Nelson (1999) argued that it is di¢ cult to
specify a capital demand function which is "both analytically tractable and
empirically successful". In the second place - similarly to sticky wages/prices
models (Ascari, 2004, Vaona, 2010) - the core of our model is in the labour
market and capital accumulation turns out to be just a superstructure, not
inducing any qualitative change in our results. Therefore, we believe our
exposition strategy is the most suited to convey the underlying intuition of
our model.
82 The households￿problem and the govern-
ment budget constraint
We follow Danthine and Kurmann (2004, 2008, 2010), by supposing the
economy to be populated by a continuum of households normalized to 1,
each composed by a continuum of individuals also normalized to 1. We adopt
a money-in-the-utility-function approach to preserve comparability with the
trend in￿ ation literature (Ascari 2004, Graham and Snower, 2004, 2008)3.






































￿t+i + qt+i(h) (2)
where ￿ is the discount factor, E is the expectation operator, U is the utility
function, ct+i (h) is consumption of household h at time t+i, Bt+i(h) are the
household￿ s bond holdings, ￿t+i is the nominal interest rate, nt+i (h) is the
fraction of employed individuals within the household, G[et+i(h)] is the disu-





is the utility arising from nominal money balances - Mt+i(h) - over the price
level - Pt+i. Wt+i (h) and Tt+i (h) are the household￿ s nominal wage income
and government transfers respectively. Finally, qt+i(h) are pro￿ts that house-
holds receive from ￿rms.
3Feenstra (1986) showed the functional equivalence of money-in-the-utility-function
models and liquidity-costs ones.
9In this framework, households, and not individuals, make all the decisions
regarding consumption, bond holdings, real money balances and e⁄ort4. In-
dividuals are identical ex-ante, but not ex-post, given that some of them are
employed - being randomly and costlessly matched with ￿rms independently
from time - and some others are unemployed. The fraction of the unem-
ployed is the same across all the families, and so their ex-post homogeneity
is preserved.
Note that in our model no utility arises from leisure, therefore individual
agents inelastically supply one unit of time for either work or unemployment
related activities. Furthermore, after Akerlof (1982), workers, though dislik-
ing e⁄ort, will be ready to exert it as a gift to the ￿rm if they receive some
other gift in exchange, such as a real compensation above some reference
level.
Similarly to Danthine and Kurmann (2004), on the basis of the empir-
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+￿3 log
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4This modelling device is not only common to e¢ ciency wages models (Danthine and
Kurmann, 2004, 2008, 2010), it is also used in neo-keynesian models with search frictions
in the labour market (Blanchard and Gal￿, 2010 on the footsteps of Merz, 1995). Its un-
derlying assumption is full risk sharing and its ultimate goal is to preserve a representative
agent setup. Alexopoulos (2004) justi￿es a similar framework assuming that households
can observe individuals￿behavior and that they can punish workers declining job o⁄ers by
withdrawing income insurance. It would also be possible to think that workers and not
households decide how much e⁄ort to elicit. However, since all workers within a household
are symmetrical, it would not change our results.
10in the social norm case5. Wt+i is the aggregate nominal wage and ut+i(h) =
1￿nt+i(h) is the unemployment rate. Note that, with di⁄erence to Danthine
and Kurmann (2004), the nominal (either individual or aggregate) wage at
time t + i ￿ 1 is assessed at the prices of time t + i. This assumption does
not entail any money illusion. On the contrary, its underlying intuition is
that households are aware of the damages that in￿ ation can produce to their
living standards and so they are ready to exchange more e⁄ort for a pay
policy that allows nominal wages to keep up with in￿ ation. More brie￿ y, a
higher in￿ ation rate reduces the reference wage.
Throughout the paper, similarly to Danthine and Kurmann (2004), we
assume ￿1;￿2 > 0 and ￿3;￿4 < 0: In words a higher household￿ s real wage
and a higher unemployment rate induce more e⁄ort. On the other hand,
a higher reference wage - be it due to either a higher aggregate wage or a
higher real value of past compensation - depresses e⁄ort.
Note that, under the hypothesis of an additively separable utility function,
utility maximization implies that
G
0 [et+i(h)] = 0 (5)
and, therefore, that in the personal norm case










5An alternative approach to the e⁄ort function is the one pursued by Campbell (2006,
2008a and 2008b), which entails a more general functional speci￿cation to be linearized
at a later stage. However, calibration is less straightforward in this context and economic
theorizing is usually followed by a number of numerical exercises where parameters and
results display a somewhat large variation. For this reason we prefer to follow Danthine
and Kurmann (2004).
11and in the social norm case
et+i(h) = ￿0 + ￿1 log
Wt+i(h)
Pt+i







Similarly to Danthine and Kurmann (2004), we assume that ct+i (h) and
Mt+i(h)
Pt+i enter (1) in logs





































where ￿t+i is the money growth rate and ￿t+i is the in￿ ation rate. The
government rebates its seigniorage proceeds to households by means of lump-
















3 First variation: the social norm case
3.1 The long-run
Firms in the perfectly competitive product market hire individuals belonging
to all the households to produce their output. Firms maximize their prof-
its - Pt+iyt+i ￿
1 Z
h=0
Wt+i(h)nt+i(h)dh, where yt+i is output - subject to their









, where ￿n is
the elasticity of substitution among di⁄erent labour kinds - and to (7), by
choosing nt+i(h) and Wt+i(h). Note that the production function displays
decreasing marginal returns to each labour type and constant returns to scale.
The ￿rst order condition with respect to nt+i(h)equates the marginal cost
of labour to its marginal product. All households are symmetrical, so we can







whereas the ￿rst order condition with respect to Wt+i(h), instead, equates










By substituting (12) into (13); one obtains the well known Solow condi-
tion
et+i = ￿1 (14)
Therefore, ￿rms, maximizing their pro￿ts, demand the same e⁄ort to all
households, across time and independently from the rate of in￿ ation. Fur-








Substitute (14) and (15) into (7) and consider that trend in￿ ation is equal











which, together with our standard assumptions on the sign of ￿4 and ￿2
6Equation (12) implies that qt (h) = 0.








The intuition underlying this result is the following. An increase in in-
￿ ation produces a decrease in the reference wage, by reducing the current
real value of the past compensation. This would spur e⁄ort, but the ￿rms￿
optimal level of e⁄ort does not depend on in￿ ation. As a consequence ￿rms
increase employment (and decrease unemployment) to keep the level of e⁄ort




Note that this mechanism does not imply that hyperin￿ ation will produce
large decreases in unemployment. In order to understand this point we focus
on the semielasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to the money
growth rate. In our context, the advantage of the semi-elasticity versus the
elasticity is that it is a measure of the reactiveness of the unemployment
rate to absolute, and not percentage, changes in the money growth rate,
mirroring, under this respect, the results provided by, among others, Ascari
(1998, 2004) and Graham and Snower (2004, 2008). The semielasticity of













In order to analyze the short run dynamics of the present economic model,
consider ￿rst that the only steady state condition we imposed to obtain (16) is
the equality of money growth and in￿ ation. Out of steady state one can write






￿2 log￿t+i. The other equations
14of the system are (9);(10); the aggregate resource constraint, yt = ct; the
production function and the condition nt = 1 ￿ ut. The equilibrium for
this model is a sequence fut+i;￿t+i;nt+i;yt+i;￿t+i;ct+ig satisfying households￿
utility maximization and ￿rms￿pro￿t maximization.
This system of equations, after log-linearization around the steady state,
can be expressed as a second order di⁄erence equation in in￿ ation, which
in its turn can be re-arranged to obtain the following system of ￿rst order
di⁄erence equations















E (^ ￿t+i+1) = ^ xt+i (20)
In the equations above, hats denote deviations from steady state, ￿￿ ￿ ￿
￿4
￿2
and iss;uss and nss are the steady state values of the nominal interest rate,
of the unemployment rate and of the employment rate respectively. In order
to investigate the stability of (19)-(20) we need to calibrate not only
￿4
￿2 as
above, but also iss;uss and nss. In order to do so we take as reference the
averages of the post-second-world-war US time series and we set uss = 0:056,
nss = 1￿uss and iss = 1:02￿(1 + ￿): We compute the roots of (19)-(20) for
various values of trend in￿ ation and the results are showed in Figure 1. As it
is possible to see the system is always saddle-path stable, give that one root
is outside the unit circle and the other one within it.
It is possible to wonder what are the e⁄ects of trend in￿ ation on the
stable arm of the system. The answer to this question is showed in Figure
2 where, following Shone (2001), di⁄erent trajectories along the stable arm
are projected on the f￿t;￿t+1g plane for trend in￿ ation rates equal to 2%,
20% and 80%. The higher is trend in￿ ation and the ￿ atter is the stable arm.
In other words, the higher is trend in￿ ation and the sharper should in￿ ation
reductions be in order to achieve stability.
154 Second variation: the personal norm case
In the personal norm case, ￿rms recognize that wage setting has intertem-
poral consequences. A wage increase will induce more e⁄ort in the ￿rst
period by raising the household￿ s real wage, but it will decrease e⁄ort in the
second period by raising the household￿ s reference wage. The ￿rms￿pro￿t
























e(h) = ￿0 + ￿1 log
Wt+i(h)
Pt+i






where ￿t;t+i is the ￿rm discount factor.























In words, ￿rms equate the discounted marginal cost of increasing the real
wage to the sum of its discounted marginal revenues, which are composed by
a positive e⁄ort e⁄ect in period t + i and a negative e⁄ort e⁄ect in period
t + i + 1.
Consider that households and ￿rms have access to a complete set of fric-
tionless security markets, which, after Lucas (1978) and Collard and de la
Croix (2000), implies that, at equilibrium, ￿t;t+i will be proportional to the
discounted marginal value of wealth, which, assuming a logarithmic sepa-
rable utility function in consumption and knowing that ct+i = yt+i; will be
16equal to ￿
t+i=yt+i:
Substituting (12)￿ which holds also for the present model - into the











In steady state this implies a modi￿ed Solow condition, which, after drop-
ping the h index due to symmetry, is
e = ￿1 + ￿￿4￿ (24)
Firms still demand the same e⁄ort level to all households across time, but
not independently from money growth, given that they now take into account
its discounted future e⁄ect on e⁄ort. As a consequence trend in￿ ation appears
to have a negative impact on ￿rms￿desired level of e⁄ort. This happens
because there are diminishing returns to the e⁄ort connected to h ￿ th kind
of labour input. Under such circumstances trend in￿ ation, equal to trend
money growth, would induce households to elicit more e⁄ort in time t+i+1
by reducing the reference wage. However, under diminishing returns, this is
less and less bene￿cial to ￿rms and, as a consequence, the marginal revenue
to wage increases would fall below their marginal cost. Firms, therefore,
anticipate households￿behavior by demanding less e⁄ort to each household
the greater is money growth. Due to symmetry, this produces a negative link
between trend in￿ ation and aggregate e⁄ort7.
This implies that the e⁄ect of money growth on unemployment does not
vanish at high in￿ ation rates. Along the lines followed in the previous section
7A graphical account of this intuition is set out in Figure A1 in the Appendix, where
(23) is depicted. The left hand side of (23) is the marginal cost of rising wages per unit
of discounted labour. The right hand side, instead, is the marginal bene￿t, which is a
decreasing function of the e⁄ort level because there are diminishing returns to the e⁄ort
elicited by household h. Money growth reduces the marginal revenue to rising wages and
therefore shifts inward the marginal revenue schedule, producing a fall in the desired level
of e⁄ort, that balances the marginal revenue and cost to a wage increase.















As a consequence lim￿!1
dlogu
d￿ 6= 0, because ￿rms hire more workers in the
attempt to reduce e⁄ort as money growth rises. This is unrealistic and we
will not develop the present model any further.
5 Third variation: the social norm case with
wage staggering
5.1 The long-run
In the present section we combine e¢ ciency wages with Taylor wage stag-
gering. In order to do so we assume households to belong to di⁄erent co-
horts, whose labour services are not perfect substitutes. This assumption is
necessary because if di⁄erent labour kinds were perfect substitutes, labour
demand for cohorts whose wage is reset would go to zero. The wage is not set
by households, as usual in wage staggering model, but by ￿rms, as customary
in fair wages models.
Note that, due to the existence of wage staggering, households belonging
to di⁄erent cohorts have di⁄erent income levels. However, as customary, we
assume they have access to complete asset markets, which allows them to
consume all the same amount of the ￿nal good as implied by the ￿rst order
condition with respect to consumption in problem (1) ￿ (2).
Following Graham and Snower (2004), one can write the ￿rms￿pro￿t




























e(h) = ￿0 + ￿1 log
Wt+Nj(h)
Pt+i






where N is the contract length. The ￿rst order conditions with respect to
















































which, given that ￿t;t+i;nt+i(h);Pt+i > 0, leads to the Solow condition
et+i(h) = ￿1 (30)



































where W ￿ is the reset wage.
Further, substitute the Solow condition into (7) and aggregate across
households keeping in mind that
Pt+i
Pt+i￿1 = ￿ to obtain








+ ￿2 logu + (￿3 + ￿4)log
W
P


































where the subscript WS stays for wage-staggering.
Subtracting (34) from (16) and taking the ￿rst order derivative with re-
spect to ￿, one can compute the semielasticity of the percentage deviation
of the unemployment rate under wage staggering from its level with ￿ exible
20wages

























@￿ is negative, it will mean that unemployment will be
more responsive to absolute changes in money growth under wage staggering
than under ￿ exible wages. In order to explore this issue, it is necessary to













We do so for di⁄erent values of N and ￿n in Figures 3 and 4 respectively.
In both the cases (36) is veri￿ed.
The intuition for this result is that wage staggering has two e⁄ects on
e⁄ort. On the one hand, wage dispersion increases with in￿ ation, leading to
a higher ratio between the wage of the resetting cohort and the aggregate
wage index. On the other hand, a higher in￿ ation rate means that, over the
contract period, the real wage of not-resetting cohorts will decline faster. The
former e⁄ect has a positive impact on e⁄ort, while the latter a negative one.
However, the former prevails on the latter one. As a matter of consequence
￿rms have to increase employment and decrease unemployment to a greater
extent than under ￿ exible wages in order to keep e⁄ort at their constant
desired level. Increasing N and ￿n boosts wage dispersion, decreasing the




215.2 The short run
In order to analyze the short run dynamics of the present economic model,
we set N = 2. The equation for the log of the unemployment rate can be


























The other equations of the system are (9);(10);(31); the aggregate resource




1=2 nt(h)dh = 1 ￿ ut, and the demands for the labour services of the house-




































The equilibrium for this model is a sequence
n
Wt+i(h)
Pt+i ; ￿t+i; ut+i; ￿t+i;
nt+i(0);nt+i(1);yt+i;￿t+i;ct+ig satisfying households￿utility maximization and
￿rms￿pro￿t maximization. We log-linearized the system around a steady
state with uss = 0:056 on the basis of the US post-WWII experience. We
calibrated the system parameters as customary in the New-Keynesian lit-
erature (see for instance Ascari, 2004): ￿ = 1:04￿ 1
2; ￿ = 1:02
1
2; ￿n = 5,
￿4
￿2 = 0:29, ￿ = 0:57
1
2. In order to attach a value to
￿1
￿2 we note that it can be
considered as the inverse of the elasticity of households￿wages with respect
22to the unemployment rate and so we set it to 0:07￿1after Nijkamp and Poot
(2005).
Figure 5, as similar ￿gures below, plots the percentage deviations from
steady state of the in￿ ation rate against those of the unemployment rate.
In other words, we plot the impulse response function of the in￿ ation rate
against that of the unemployment rate in order to show the unemployment-
in￿ ation trade-o⁄in a more direct way. As it is possible to see, wage stagger-
ing implies a ￿ atter Phillips curve than ￿ exible wages not only in the long-run
but in the short run too. Note that increasing ￿n from 5 to 15 would not
change our results markedly9. Instead, increasing N from 2 to 4 has a consid-
erable impact on the dynamics of in￿ ation and unemployment. As showed in
Figure 6, their reactiveness increases, however, unemployment ￿rst declines
and then increases before going back to its steady state value. A shortcoming
of this model is that, with di⁄erence to the other models presented in this
work, a monetary expansion can cause a contraction in output due to the
ine¢ ciencies arising from ￿rms shifting labour demand from one cohort to
the other, given that di⁄erent labour kinds are imperfect substitutes. For
N=4 and ￿n = 5 a one percentage shock in money growth produces a 0.18
percent decline in output. This is implausible and for this reason the model
presented in this section is not our preferred one.
6 Fourth variation: the social norm case with
varying capital
Once considering varying capital within the model, we assume the existence
of capital adjustment costs after Bernanke et al. (1999) and Gertler (2002).
The households￿budget constraint changes to


























[Kt+i(h) ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt+i￿1(h)] + qt+i(h)
where Kt+i(h) is the capital held by household h, ￿ is the capital deprecia-
tion rate, Rt+i is the capital rental rate and Qt+i is the nominal Tobin￿ s q.
Furthermore, households maximize utility with respect to capital too and in-
teracting the ￿rst order conditions for capital and consumption leads, under











As in the New-Keynesian tradition, we assume the existence of an inter-
mediate labour market, where labour intermediaries hire households￿horizon-
tally di⁄erentiated labour inputs to produce homogeneous labour to be sold
to ￿rms operating on the ￿nal product market. In the intermediate labour
market we assume productivity to depend on e⁄ort. The pro￿t maximization























= ￿1 = et+i = 1 (44)
Firms in the ￿nal product market maximize pro￿ts hiring labour and
24capital and adopting a Cobb-Douglas production function. The solution





















(1 ￿ ￿) (47)
Finally, capital producer j has the following production function
Y
k







t+i (j) is new capital, It+i (j) is raw output used as material input at
time t + i and ￿
0 (￿) > 0, ￿








the steady state investment-capital ratio. Kt+i (j) is capital rented after it
has been used to produce ￿nal output within the period. The pro￿ts of the







Kt+i (j) ￿ It+i (j) ￿
Zk
t+iKt+i(j) where Zk
t+i is the rental price of capital used for producing new









￿ 1 = 0 (49)
where It+i =
R 1
0 It+i (j)dj and Kt+i￿1 =
R 1
0 Kt+i￿1 (j)dj. One can show that






K and (49) imply
that Zk
t+i is approximately zero near the steady state and so it can be ignored.
25The system of equations is therefore composed by (9);(10); the aggregate






Kt+i ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Kt+i￿1, the de￿nition of the unemployment rate
nt = 1 ￿ ut, (40), (42), (45); (46), (47), (49) and (7), which imposing (44)






























satisfying utility and pro￿t maximization prob-
lems.
Regarding the long-run we note that in steady state the real Tobin￿ s q is
equal to one and therefore that R
P and W
P are pinned down by (42) and (47)
independently from money growth. On the basis of (50) and of the steady
state equality of in￿ ation and money growth, this entails that (17) and (18)
also hold for the present model.
Regarding the short-run, we do not change the calibration of the parame-
ters that already appeared in the previous sections of the present work, with
the only exception that, given that we have ￿ exible wages here, we do not
rise them to the power of 1
2. Following the same reasoning above regarding
the elasticity of the wage to the unemployment rate we set
(￿1+￿3)
￿2 = 0:07￿1.
Furthermore, as customary, ￿ = 0:33, ￿ = 1 ￿ 0:92 and, after Bernanke et








K] = 0:5: We log-linearize the system around the
steady state. The short-run Phillips curve with ￿xed and varying capital
are plotted in Figure 7. The result that higher in￿ ation goes hand in hand
with a lower unemployment rate, whose intuition was discussed commenting
equation (17), is con￿rmed also for the present model. As it is possible to
see, varying capital implies a ￿ atter short run Phillips curve than under ￿xed
capital, given that the boom following a monetary expansion is reinforced by
26an increase of investments, which rise upon impact by 0.08%10. Figure 7 also
shows that increasing trend in￿ ation decreases the responsiveness of both the
in￿ ation and unemployment rates to a 1% monetary shock. This is consistent
with our results above that increasing trend in￿ ation ￿ attens the stable arm
of the economic system without capital and it can be explained by keeping
in mind two facts. First, households smooth consumption and, second, an
increase in trend in￿ ation decreases the elasticity of the money demand func-
tion to the nominal interest rate11. If households smooth consumption, they
will tend to smooth also real money holdings - see equation (10). This, in
presence of a smaller reactiveness of money demand to the nominal interest
rate, can happen only thanks to a larger reaction in the latter one (Figure
8). In other words, households achieve a stable path for consumption and
real money holdings in face of a monetary shock with higher trend in￿ ation
by letting the interest rate to react more, which stabilizes the whole econ-
omy and implies a smaller change in in￿ ation too. A smaller change in the
in￿ ation rate translates into a smaller change in the unemployment rate via
the Phillips curve (50).
10Changing ￿ would only have negligible e⁄ects on the Phillips curve. Further results
are available from the author on request. It is worth noting that our model does not
produce a persistent reaction of either the unemployment or the in￿ ation rate after a
monetary shock. This accords well with the empirical evidence produced by the in￿ ation
persistence network, whose main result is that, once allowing for structural breaks in the
mean of the in￿ ation time series, in￿ ation has low persistence (Altissimo et al., 2007).
Empirical evidence of a fast adjustment of unemployment after a monetary shock was
produced by Karanassou et al. (2007, p. 346) where the unemployment rate takes just
two periods to hit its new long-run level after a permanent monetary shock. However, this
low persistence is not a property of e¢ ciency wages themselves. Danthine and Kurmann
(2004, 2010) showed that, once e¢ ciency wages are coupled with price rigidities, it is
possible to produce persistent impulse response functions.
11Loglinearizing (10); one can show that this elasticity is 1
iss￿1 where iss is equal to
trend in￿ ation over the discount factor.
277 Fifth and sixth variations: reciprocity in
labor relations and the Phillips curve
The present section adopts an approach ￿ la Danthine and Kurmann (2008,
2010), that can be nested into our model by specifying G[et+i(h)] = 1
2 [et+i(h)]
2￿
<[et+i(h);:]; where <[et+i(h);:] is the product of the gifts of the represen-
tative worker, d[et+i(h);:]; and the ￿rm g [Wt+i(h);:]. In words, when per-
ceiving a generous wage o⁄er by the ￿rm - g [Wt+i(h);:] > 0 - the utility
of a worker increases by eliciting more e⁄ort - d[et+i(h);:] > 0. Note that
d[et+i(h);:] = [et+i(h)]
￿ with 0 < ￿ < 1 and






















In the above equation, log
Wt+i(h)
Pt+i accounts for the the consumption utility at-
tached by the representative worker to the ￿rm￿ s actual wage o⁄er. log
yt+i
nt+i(h)
proxies for ￿rms￿ability to pay, by describing the utility obtained if the ￿rm
distributed its whole revenue to workers. In case a worker quits and ￿nds















represents the e⁄ect of the current real
value of past compensation on the reference wage. This formulation encom-
passes both the social norm case (with s = 1) and the personal norm one
(with s = 0). Finally, f1;f2 and f3 are non-negative parameters.








Pt+i ￿ f1 log
yt+i




















We perform the ￿rm pro￿t maximization problem as in our second vari-
28ation above to obtain the ￿rst order conditions with respect to Wt+i(h) and


















































After some manipulation and interacting (53) and (54); one obtains a
















Along the lines followed in the previous variations it is possible to show
that lim￿!1
@ logn
@￿ 6= 0: In other words, one obtains the same result as in our
second variation at the price of a heavier parametrization.
We now focus on the social norm case, namely we impose s = 1. Under




















On the footsteps of our ￿rst variation, it is possible to show that the





This has similar implications for the short-run and long-run Phillips curve to
29those of our ￿rst variation at the additional cost of heavier parametrization.
8 Conclusions
In the present paper, we explored the relationship between in￿ ation and
unemployment in di⁄erent models with fair wages and reciprocity in labor
relations. We showed that, under customary assumptions regarding the para-
meters of the e⁄ort function, they have negative long- and short-run nexuses.
This is motivated by the fact that ￿rms respond to in￿ ation - which spurs ef-
fort via a decrease in the reference wage - by increasing employment in order
to maintain the e⁄ort level constant, as implied by the Solow condition. Un-
der wage staggering this e⁄ect is stronger because wage dispersion magni￿es
the impact of in￿ ation on e⁄ort. This e⁄ect is also stronger in the short-
run once considering varying instead of ￿xed capital as booms generated by
monetary expansions are reinforced by greater investment.
Once considering the personal norm case, the model produces an unrealis-
tic negative impact of hyper-in￿ ation on unemployment. Furthermore, under
wage-staggering the model can produce output contractions in response to
monetary expansions. Finally, shifting to a model with reciprocity in labour
relations does not substantially change our results to the price of a much
heavier parametrization. For these reasons, our preferred variation is the
social norm case with ￿ exible wages and, possibly, varying capital.
Our results can o⁄er new theoretical insights into the evidence produced
by recent empirical contributions ￿nding a negative long-run relationship
between unemployment and in￿ ation.
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 Figure 2 - The stable arm for different trend inflation rates 































































trend inflation=2% per year
trend inflation=20% per year
trend inflation=80% per year
   Figure 3 – Ω(µ) for different money growth rates and contract lengths 





















Notes: θn was set equal to 5; for a definition of Ω(µ) see equation (22). Figure 4 – Ω(µ) for different money growth rates and elasticities of substitution among labour 
kinds 
















Notes: N was set equal to 2; for a definition of Ω(µ) see equation (22). 
 Figure 5 – The short-run Phillips curve with flexible and staggered wages 
 






































































percentage deviation of the unemployment rate from steady state
flexible wages
staggered wages
 Figure 6 – The short-run Phillips curve with staggered wages and with different number of 
cohorts 
 






































































percentage deviation of the unemployment rate from steady state
two cohorts
four cohorts
 Figure 7 – The short-run Phillips curve with fixed and varying capital 



































































percentage deviation of the unemployment rate from steady state
fixed capital
varying capital and 2% trend inflation
varying capital and 20% trend inflation
 Figure 8 – Impulse response function of the nominal interest rate after a 1% monetary shock 
























































Time periods after shock
2% trend  inflaion
20% trend inflarion
 Figure A1 - Firms equating marginal cost and revenues to wage increases under efficiency 
wages and diminishing returns to effort of different labour kinds 
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